

# The Incentive Structure Of Impure Public Good Provision ; The Case Of International Fisheries

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**Abstract :** We argue that international fisheries are a prime example to study the impact of multiple characteristics, on the incentive structure of non-cooperative and cooperative impure public good provision. The degree of socially constructed excludability is captured by the distinction between the internationally (publically) accessible domain of high seas and the state-owned (privately owned) exclusive economic zones, as defined by international law; the degree of technical excludability is related to the pattern of fish migration between various zones and the degree of rivalry is reflected by the growth rate of the resource. Hence, our model is also capable of analyzing the benefit-cost duality between public goods and common pool resources.